A theory T is trustworthy iff, whenever a theory U is interpretable in T , then it is faithfully interpretable. In this paper we provide a characterization of trustworthiness. We provide a simple proof of Friedman's Theorem that finitely axiomatized, sequential, consistent theories are trustworthy. We provide an example of a theory whose schematic predicate logic is complete Π 0 2 .
Contents

Introduction
Let's begin with a definition. Definition 1.1 A theory T is trustworthy if every U interpretable in T is also faithfully interpretable in T .
Thus our trustworthiness is the trustworthiness of someone who is, in principle, able to truly tell a story without false embellishments. Trustworthiness is a peculiar notion that has nothing to do with strength. It has to do with the constraint a theory puts on the available linguistic means. In Section 6 we will probe deeper into the true and proper nature of trustworthiness. This paper is a study of trustworthiness. We aim to show that the notion of trustworthiness is interesting both in its own right and by its connection to other notions.
Contents of the Paper
Three central results form the core of the paper. The first is a characterization of trustworthiness. This characterization is provided in Section 5.
As the second central result, we will reprove Friedman's Theorem concerning trustworthiness. The theorem is reported in Craig Smoryński's paper [Smo85a] (Theorem 3, on p224). The theorem states that finitely axiomatized, adequate (sequential 1 ), consistent theories are trustworthy. The proof of the result is provided in Section 5. Friedmans' Theorem will be proved as a consequence of our characterization and of a theorem that is proved in Section 4. In fact, the results of Section 4 make a modest strengthening of Friedman's result possible.
Our third central result is the description of trustworthiness in terms af an adjunction between the preorder of faithful interpretability and the preorder of interpretability. This result is proved in Section 6.
An important method used in the paper is the use of the FGH Theorem, which approximately says that we can prove the following principle in Elementary Arithmetic. Let T be a theory into which a suitable fragment of Arithmetic can be interpreted. Then, for any Σ 0 1 -sentence S, there is a Σ 0 1 -sentence R, such that (S ∨ incon(T )) is equivalent to P T R. I.o.w. if T is consistent then S is equivalent to a T -provability statement. Since the FGH Theorem plays such an important role, I devote Section 3 to an extensive discussion of it and its applications.
A side result with some independent interest is contained in appendix C. We give an example of a theory whose schematic logic is complete Π 0 2 .
Prerequisites
Most of what is needed to understand the paper is contained in the textbook [HP91] .
History of the Paper
The present paper is a sequel of [Vis93] . In that work a somewhat sharper version of Theorem 4.1 of the present paper was proved. The present proof is, however, considerably simpler. The article [Vis93] , was the result of reflecting on Jan Krajíček's [Kra87] . In that paper Krajíček studies ViteslavŠvejdar's question "When is it consistent for inconsistency proofs to lie between cuts?". In other words, for which theories T and for which T -cuts I and J is the theory T + con J (T ) + incon I (T ) consistent? Krajíček proves that for every finitely axiomatized, sequential and consistent theory T , and for every T -cut I, we can find a T -cut J such thatŠvejdar's question has a positive answer for T , I, J.
Neither Krajíček nor I noted that Krajíček's Theorem is an immediate consequence of Friedman's Theorem on trustworthiness.
2 I only realized this recently after Harvey Friedman reminded me of his result in e-mail correspondence. It turns out that in the other direction, the methods of [Vis93] yield a proof of Friedman's Theorem. This paper reports this proof.
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Arithmetization
In this section we introduce some basic notions and conventions.
Theories and Interpretations
Theories in this paper are theories of first order predicate logic. Unless stated otherwise, we will assume that theories have an axiom set that is p-time decidable. Interpretations between theories are relative interpretations. For a description of the notion of relative interpretation, see the classical [TMR53] , or e.g. [Vis98] . We write:
• T £ U , for ∃K K:T £ U .
We will be interested in theories in which a sufficiently large fragment of arithmetic is relatively interpretable. Let us fix a weak, finitely axiomatized, arithmetical theory F. Our theory has as language, the arithmetical language with 0, S, +, ×, ≤. The theory F is axiomatized by Robinson's Arithmetic Q plus 2 See remark 5.7 of the present paper.
axioms that ≤, is linear, plus the axiom x ≤ Sy ↔ (x ≤ y ∨ x = Sy). 3 We use F instead of Q, because it is pleasant to have some important properties of the Rosser ordering in one's simplest theory.
The theory F is interpretable in Q on a definable initial segment I. See [HP91] , pp 366-371. We comment on some details in our appendix D.
To numerize a theory T is to specify an interpretation N such that N : T £F. Thus, a theory T is numerizable if T £ F. We will also need the notion of numerized theory. A numerized theory T is a pair T, N , where N : T £ F. The numerized theory T, N is a numerization of the numerizable theory T . In the context of numerized theories T , the variables x, y, z, . . . will range over the numbers provided by N . Thus, e.g. ∀x . . . will mean ∀x (δ N (x) → . . .). We will use ξ, η, . . . for general variables. We will use T + A for T + A, N , etc.
We will be sloppy between numerizable and numerized in the case of 'explicitly arithmetical' theories, like PA. Officially, PA is a numerizable theory. However, we will confuse it with the numerized theory PA, id , where id is the identity interpretation.
We will fix an arithmetization of metamathematical notions in the language of F. The arithmetization is supposed to be efficient so that we can verify all relevant facts in Buss' S 1 2 . See e.g. [Bus86] or [HP91] . 4 We will write P U A (P U A), for prov U (#A) (prov U (#A)). The use of P U (P U ) will be only meaningful inside a numerized theory T = T, N . The formalization of an outer P will always be in the designated numbers given by N . So P U A will be a different formula inside T, N than inside T, K , if N and K are different. Boxes inside boxes will take their numerization from the numerized theory corresponding to the first box above in the parse tree. In appendix A this convention is made precise. The convention is best illustrated by some examples.
Example 2.1 Suppose T = T, N and U = T, K are numerized theories.
• 'T ∀ξ ∃y Q(ξ, y)', where Q is an atomic predicate, means:
T ∀ξ ∃η (δ N (η) ∧ Q(ξ, η)).
• 'T P U ∀ξ ∃y R(ξ, y)', where R is an atomic predicate, means:
is meaningless. There is nothing to tell us from which set of numbers to take the witnesses for P U .
• 'T P U A → P U B' is meaningless. The witnesses for outer P's must come from the numerization of T .
•
Where could the witnesses for the last P U come from?
3 Our version of Robinson's Arithmetic has ≤ as an atomic symbol and includes the axiom y ≤ x ↔ ∃z z + y = x. See appendix D. 4 As is well known, we can replace S 1 2 by a variant in the arithmetical language. We assume we are working with this variant.
Schematic letters A, B, range over the expanded language with boxes and two kinds of variables or over the original language. Schematic letters for Σ 0 1 -formulas receive the same treatment as boxed formulas: they range of Σ 0 1 -formulas relativized to the stipulated numbers.
Free variables in a formula inside a P will be treated according to the usual convention so that they are still free in the resulting formula. Thus, A(x) inside a box will really stand for a term that defines the following function: we map the number n to Gödelnumber of the result of substituting the (binary) numeral n of n for x in A.
5
There are various orderings for interpretations of F in a numerizable theory T . The one that is relevant for us is given as follows.
• E : K ≤ T N iff E is a T -formula which T -provably gives an initial embedding of the K-numbers into the N -numbers. We omit the subscript if the theory is clear from the context.
We give the clauses for E. To increase readability we use Plus for + and Times for ×.
Any provably initial embedding E : K → N can be split into two parts: E 0 : K → I, and emb : I → N . Here E 0 is a provable isomorphism and I is an initial segment of the N -numbers, satisfying F. The embedding emb is the identical embedding of I into N . We will call such an initial segment of N satisfying F a T -cut of N . If we are considering a numerized theory T = T, N , then we will call a T -cut of N a T -cut. A sequential theory is a theory with a good notion of sequence for all objects of the domain of the theory. This notion is due to Pavel Pudlák. See e.g. [Pud85] , or [HP91] , p151. The notion of sequential theory is equivalent to Harvey Friedman's notion of adequate theory. (See [Smo85a] .) A sequential theory is always numerizable. Here are a few facts about ≤ and cuts. ∀z ∃I P T ∀x∈I ∃y itexp(x, |z|) = y.
Here |n| = entier( 2 log(n)).Thus |n| is the binary length of n.
2. For any numerized theory T = T, N , there is a T -cut I, such that I : T £(I∆ 0 +Ω 1 ). Since I is a cut, Π This theorem is due to Pavel Pudlák ([Pud85] ). 6 Note that, by 2., we can always assume that K : T £ I∆ 0 + Ω 1 .
4. Suppose I is a T -cut. Then we have:
This theorem is the obis-principle. It shows that numbers that are big outside are always small inside. The result is proved e.g. in [WP87].
Remark 2.3 Consider a numerized theory T = T, N . Let I, J range over T -cuts. We can assign an invariant to T as follows:
li stands for 'limes inferior'. It is easily seen that, if T is consistent, then li(T ) is also consistent. We find that li(T ) extends I∆ 0 + BΣ
∀x≤a ∃y S 0 (y) → ∃b ∀x≤a ∃y≤b S 0 (y), where S 0 ∈ ∆ 0 . The formula con n stands for consistency w.r.t. n-provability. (See Section 4, for an explanation.)
In case T is sequential, by Fact 2.2(3), li(T ) will be independent of the numerization T of T . Thus, we may write li(T ), when T is sequential. For sequential theories T and U , we find the following. 
li(T ) extends
I∆ 0 + BΣ 0 1 + {con n (T ) | n ∈ ω}. 2. If li(T ) ⊆ li(U ), then T is locally interpretable in U .
Preliminaries to Rosser Arguments
Suppose A = ∃x A 0 (x) and B = ∃x B 0 (x). Here A 0 and B 0 are arbitrary formulas of the language of some numerized theory T = T, N . Remember that x and y range over the N -numbers. We write:
Formulas of the form A ≤ B and A < B are called witness comparison formulas. We present some facts about witness comparison formulas.
Proof
We prove (5) . Reason in T . Suppose A ≤ A. This tells us that {x | A 0 (x)} has a smallest element, say x 0 . We have ∀y<x 0 ¬ B 0 (y) or ∃y<x 0 B 0 (y). In the first case, we find A ≤ B, in the second, B < A. P
In I∆ 0 , we can prove the ∆ 0 -minimum principle. So, I∆ 0 S → S ≤ S, for S ∈ ∃∆ 0 . In fact, ∆ 0 -induction is equivalent to this principle, assuming we allow free parameters in S. Similarly, Buss' theory T 
Note that it follows, from the conclusion of Corollary 2.6, by substituting S for A, that T S → S ≤ S, which expresses the ∆ 0 -minimum principle [Σ 1 -completeness, we find PS 0 (x), for some x. By the obis-principle, we find PS I , for any T -definable cut I. By Fact 2.2(2), we can pick I such that it satisfies I∆ 0 + Ω 1 .
8 It follows that in P(S ≤ S) I and, thus, P(S ≤ S). P
The following fact is, modulo some insignificant differences, verified in [VV94].
Fact 2.8 Small Reflection Principle. Let T = T, N be a sequential numerized theory. Suppose that T is either finitely axiomatized or an extension by finitely many axioms of I∆ 0 + Ω 1 (relativized to N ). Let P := P T . Let S be ∃Σ b 1 . Let A be any sentence in the language of T . We have:
7 For a description of T 1 2 , see [Bus86] or [HP91] . 8 In fact, we need only a sufficiently large finite fragment of I∆ 0 + Ω 1 here.
We finish this section by providing a verification of Rosser's Theorem in S 1 2 for theories finitely axiomatized over either S 1 2 or I∆ 0 + Ω 1 . The idea of this argument is due to ViteslavŠvejdar. See [Šve83] .
Theorem 2.9 Fast Rosser Theorem. Let T be a sequential numerized theory. Suppose that T is either finitely axiomatized or an extension by finitely many axioms of I∆ 0 + Ω 1 (relativized to N ). Let P := P T . Let R be such that S
Reason in S NP=co-NP.
A Miraculous Argument
Sometimes, in Mathematics, we meet an argument that is utterly simple, and yet has many surprising consequences. The reasoning leading to the FGH Theorem surely qualifies as an example of such an argument. It is a Rosser type argument and, thus, it inherits the inherent mystery of such arguments. It is a simple Rosser type argument, not much more complicated in terms of number of steps than Rosser's original argument, even simpler in terms of the definition of the fixed point. However, the formalization of the FGH Theorem seems to ask for more resources than the formalization of Rosser's, as will be explained below.
The FGH Theorem
Let us first state the FGH Theorem. Let EA be Elementary Arithmetic, i.e. I∆ 0 + exp. This theory is called EFA in [Smo85a] .
Theorem 3.1 Consider any numerized theory T = T, N . Let P := P T . Let S be Σ 0 1 and let R be such that Q R ↔ S ≤ PR. We have:
'FGH' stands for Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington. The history is as follows.
Around 1976 Warren Goldfarb rediscovered the principle independently in November 1980. He communicated the result to George Boolos. Boolos then promulgated it to the logic of provability community. Via this channel I learned of it. So I called it Goldfarb's Principle. I guess everyone gets due credit in my new name for it: The FGH Theorem. Here is the proof.
Proof
Reason in EA.
Step 1. Suppose S ∨ P⊥. We want to derive R ∨ P⊥. If we have P⊥, we are done. Suppose S. It follows that R ∨ R ⊥ . In the first case, we are again done. In case we have R ⊥ , we find (a) PR, since
Combining (a) and (b), we obtain P⊥.
Step 2. Suppose R ∨ P⊥. By Σ 0 1 -completeness, we find PR ∨ P⊥, hence, PR.
Step 3. Suppose PR. We want to derive R ∨ P⊥. We find: R ∨ R ⊥ . Now we may proceed as in step 1.
Step 4. Suppose R ∨ P⊥. We may immediately conclude that S ∨ P⊥. P Remark 3.2 We can also prove EA P¬R ⊥ ↔ PR. Right-to-left is trivial. In the other direction, let I be a T -cut satisfying I∆ 0 + Ω 1 . We have:
The last step is an application of Löb's Theorem for T, I . For a discussion of Löb's theorem with shifting interpretations, see [Vis93] , section 4.
An immediate generalization of the FGH theorem is due essentially to Franco Montagna.
Theorem 3.3 Consider any numerized theory T = T, N . Let P := P T . Let S(x) be Σ 0 1 and let R be such that Q R ↔ S(#R) ≤ PR. We have:
It is easy to see that Rosser's Theorem is an immediate consequence of Montagna's Theorem. We end this subsection, by proving a variant of a part of the FGH Theorem that will be used in Section 4.
Theorem 3.4 Consider any numerized theory T . Let P := P T . Let A be ∃∀∆ 0 and let R be such that Q R ↔ A ≤ PR. Let BΣ 0 1 be the Σ 0 1 -collection principle: ∀x≤a ∃y S 0 (y) → ∃b ∀x≤a ∃y≤b S 0 (y), where S 0 ∈ ∆ 0 . We have:
Reason in EA + BΣ 1 . Suppose PR. We have A ≤ PR or PR < A. In the first case, we may conclude A, and we are done. Suppose PR < A. This has the form ∃p (proof(p, #R) ∧ ∀y≤p ∃z ¬ A 0 (y, z)), where A 0 is in ∆ 0 . By Σ 0 1 -collection, our formula is equivalent to:
Thus, we find: PC, and, hence, P(R < A). I.o.w., PR ⊥ . Combining this with our assumption PR, we find P⊥ and we are done. P
The FGH Theorem and S 1 2
It is an open problem whether the FGH Theorem can be formalized in S 1 2 , even for S ∈ ∃Σ b 1 . However for a restricted range of theories we can prove a salient consequence of FGH Theorem.
Theorem 3.5 Let T = T, N be a sequential numerized theory. Suppose that T is either finitely axiomatized or an extension by finitely many axioms of I∆ 0 + Ω 1 (relativized to N ). We write P := P T . Let A be any T -sentence. Let R be such that Q R ↔ PA ≤ PR. We have:
Suppose PA. By the small reflection principle 2.8, we have (a):
By PA and Fact 2.7, we have (b) P(PA ≤ PR ∨ PR < PA). Combining (a) and (b), we find PR.
Conversely, suppose PR. By the small reflection principle 2.8, we have:
i.e. P(R → A). Ergo, PA. P
Some Consequences of the FGH Theorem
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is our central application of the FGH Theorem in this paper. We also use it in the proof of Theorem C.7. In this subsection we spell out some more immediate consequences of Theorem 3.1. These consequences are not strictly needed for the rest of the paper. They have, however, heuristic value. Moreover, they are interesting in their own right. For some further information, the reader is referred to [Smo85b] , chapter 7.
1-Reducibility
We give a quick proof of a well-known fact.
Theorem 3.6 Suppose T can be extended to a consistent numerizable theory W . Then, any RE set is 1-reducible to T . A fortiori, T is of Turing degree 0 .
Proof
Clearly, we may assume that W is a finite extension of T , say W = T + A. Let W = W, N be a numerization of W . Consider any RE set X with index e. Let R n be the FGH sentence for the theory W corresponding to the sentence S n := ({e}n 0). Clearly, the mapping n → (A → R N n ) is recursive. By the FGH Theorem, formulated externally, we have: n ∈ X ⇔ T A → R N n . P
Closure under Disjunction
We show that provabilities are closed under disjunction.
Theorem 3.7 Let T be a numerized theory. Let P := P T . For any sentences A and B of the language of T , there is a Σ 1 -sentence C such that EA PC ↔ (PA ∨ PB).
Proof
Take S := (PA ∨ PB) in Theorem 3.1. P Note that C can in fact be taken to be ∃Π b 1 .
Degrees of Provably Deductive Consequence
Let T be numerized. Let A and B be be sentences of the language of T . Let P := P T . We define:
• A ≡ T B :⇔ A T B and B T A.
We call T provably deductive consequence and we call ≡ T provably deductive equivalence. Clearly, these notions yield a degree structure on the sentences of T . 
Proof
Let γ be such a degree. Suppose C ∈ γ. Take S := PC in Theorem 3.1. P
Smoryński's Theorem
The following application is due to Smoryński. See [Smo81] , p366 or [Smo85b] , p312.
Theorem 3.9 Let T = T, N be numerized theory. Suppose T EA. Then, we have, verifiably in EA, that T is Σ 0 1 -sound iff T is consistent and T + con(T ) is Σ 0 1 -conservative over T .
Proof
We write P := P T . Reason in EA.
Suppose that T is consistent and T +con(T ) is Σ 0 1 -conservative over T . Suppose PS. Applying the first equivalence of the FGH Theorem inside the P, we obtain P(R ∨ P⊥). Ergo, P(con(T ) → R). By Σ 0 1 -conservativity, it follows that PR. We may conclude, now applying the FGH Theorem outside the P, that S. P Note that the assumption that T EA, was only used in the second part of the proof in the 'internal' application of the FGH Theorem. We can extend the result to theories T such that every T -cut I has a subcut J with J : T £ T . Examples of such theories are S 1 2 , I∆ 0 + Ω 14 + con(F), I∆ 0 + {Ω n+1 | n ∈ ω} and PA + incon(PA), Theorem 3.10 Let T = T, N be numerized theory. Suppose that every T -cut I has a subcut J with J : T £ T . Then, we have, verifiably in EA, that T is Σ 0 1 -sound iff T is consistent and T + con(T ) is Σ 0 1 -conservative over T .
We replace the second part of the previous proof by the following variation. Suppose that T is consistent and that T + con(T ) is Σ 0 1 -conservative over T . Suppose PS. Using Fact 2.2 (2), (1), we can find a T -cut J such that (a) J :
Since, in the proof of Σ 
We may conclude from (c) and
Hence, P(con(T ) → R). By Σ 0 1 -conservativity, it follows that PR. We may conclude, by the FGH Theorem, that S. P
Here is a corollary from Theorem 3.9. A theory T = T, N is reflexive if it proves for every n the statement con(T n ). Here T n is the theory axiomatized by EA N plus the T -axioms with Gödelnumber less than or equal to n.
Corollary 3.11 Suppose T is a consistent, numerized, reflexive theory such that T EA. Suppose there is an n, such that, for all Σ 0 1 -sentences S, whenever T S, we have T n S. Then T is Σ 0 1 -sound.
Let P := P T and P n := P Tn . Suppose P n (con(T n ) → S), then, by reflexivity, PS. Hence, P n S. Applying Theorem 3.9 to T n , we find S. So T n is Σ 0 1 -sound. Hence, T is also Σ 0 1 -sound. P
The above theorem tells us that, if a theory that is consistent, numerized, reflexive and verifies EA, proves a false Σ 0 1 -sentence, then it is forced to tell more and more complex lies, i.e., it will prove false Σ In this section, we prove a theorem that will be the main lemma to our proof that consistent, finitely axiomatized, sequential theories are trustworthy. Let EA + be I∆ 0 + supexp, where supexp is the axiom stating that the superexponentiation function is total.
Theorem 4.1 Let T := T, N be a finitely axiomatized, sequential theory. We write P := P T . There is a T -cut I such that, for all Σ 0 1 -sentences S, EA
Before proving our theorem we formulate and prove an immediate corollary.
Corollary 4.2 Let T := T, N be a finitely axiomatized, sequential theory.
There is a T -cut I such that T, I is (EA + + con(T ))-verifiably Σ 0 1 -sound.
Let I be the cut promised in theorem 4.1. We have, for any Σ 0 1 -sentence S, EA + + con(T ) P T S I → S, and hence, EA + + con(T ) P T,I S → S. P
To get the proof of theorem 4.1 going, we need a few preparatory steps. We will apply the FGH Theorem to a restricted proof predicate, where the formulas in the proof are restricted to formulas of a certain complexity. We take as measure of complexity ρ, where ρ(A) is the depth of quantifier changes. This measure is discussed in some detail in [Vis93] . We take Γ n to be the set of formulas of complexity at most n and Γ cl n the set of sentences of Γ n . m-provability will be provability from axioms with Gödelnumber below m, where the formulas occurring in the proof are all in Γ m .
The notation A(k) is somewhat misleading. In general we are working in some interpretation of number theory. So the term k occurs in unwinded relational form. Our measure ρ is designed to be insensitive to such fine points. 
Suppose, for simplicity, that we are working with tally-numerals. A(k) in T could look like this:
The complexity of this formula is max(ρ(0 N (x)), ρ(S N (x, y)), ρ(A(x)))+1. This formula is clearly estimated by ρ(A(x)) + c, for a fixed standard c. Similar reasoning works for efficient numerals based e.g. on binary notations. P
Here is a fundamental lemma about P n .
Lemma 4.4 Suppose that T := T, N is a finitely axiomatized theory. Let P and P m be the provability and the m-provability predicates of T . We have, for any T -sentence A and k > ρ(A) and k larger than the complexities of the axioms of T , EA
The left-to-right direction is obvious. To prove the right-to-left direction, reason in EA + . Suppose PA. We can, using supexp, find a cutfree proof in predicate logic of C → A, where C is the conjunction of the T -axioms. See [HP91] , part V, chapter 5, for details. By the subformula property, this proof is also an k-proof. P
Note that we used the fact that T is finitely axiomatized in an essential way in the proof.
Open Question 4.5 Is it possible to replace, in the usual superexponential estimate of the growth involved in cut elimination, the usual measure of complexity (depth of connectives) by ρ, i.e. depth of quantifier changes?
Lemma 4.6 Let T := T, N is a finitely axiomatized. Let P and P m be the provability and the m-provability predicates of T . Consider a Σ 0 1 -sentence S. We can find R m such that Q R m ↔ S ≤ P m R m , by the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma. Note that ρ(R m ) := ρ(S) + c, for a standard c which is independent of m. Choose n > ρ(S) + c. We have: EA
We want to apply the FGH Theorem. To do this we must verify that the steps in the proof go through for our n-provability. Note e.g. that n is large enough to have: EA R n → P n R n and EA R ⊥ n → PR ⊥ n . Thus, we have: EA (S ∨ P n ⊥) ↔ P n R n . Now apply Lemma 4.4. P
Our proof strategy will be to provide a cut I, such that, EA + -verifiably, we have PR n ↔ PS I . Then we may apply Lemma 4.6. To get the desired result, we need a reflection principle.
Lemma 4.7 Let U := U, M be any sequential theory. Let P be U-provability and let P n be U-n-provability. For any n, we can find an U-cut J such that EA ∀A∈Γ
This is Fact 2.4.5(ii) of [Vis93] . The idea is that, in U, we can define a satisfaction predicate for Γ n and prove Γ n -reflection by replacing induction over proof length by the use of a definable cut. P
The next lemma is nearly the theorem we are aiming to prove. The only defect is that I is still dependent on ρ(S).
Lemma 4.8 Let T := T, N be a finitely axiomatized, sequential theory. We write P := P T . For any Σ 
Take n and R n as in Lemma 4.6. Let R := R n . We have, by Lemma 4.6, (a) EA + (S ∨ P⊥) ↔ PR. Choose a reflecting T -cut I for P n as in Lemma 4.7. By Fact 2.2(2), we can choose I in such a way that it verifies ∆ 0 -induction. Note that I will only depend on ρ(S).
The left-to-right direction is immediate by the obis-principle. We treat the other direction. By (a), it is sufficient to show that EA
Reason in EA + . Suppose PS I . Since we have ∆ 0 -induction in I, it follows that P(S ≤ P n R ∨ P n R < S)
I and so P((S ≤ P n R) I ∨ (P n R < S) I ). The first disjunct is equivalent to R I , which implies R. To the second disjunct we apply the reflection principle from Lemma 4.7 to infer R. Thus, we obtain PR. P
We want to make the cut I independent of the Σ 0 1 -sentence S. The problem is that Σ 0 1 -sentences may have arbitrarily large ρ-complexities. If we would have N : T £ EA, there would be no problem, since we have EA S ↔ true Σ (#S), where true Σ is the ordinary Σ 0 1 -truth predicate, which is itself given by a Σ 0 1 -formula. All sentences of the form true Σ (#S) have some complexity below a fixed finite n. We can use the idea even in the absence of EA by making our cut smaller. Here is another lemma. Lemma 4.9 Let S = ∃xS 0 (x), where S 0 ∈ ∆ 0 . Let the truth predicate be of the form ∃y true Σ,0 (y, z), where (true Σ,0 (y, z)) ∈ ∆ 0 . There is a fixed standard k, such that S 1 2
The proof is by inspecting the usual EA-proof of S → true Σ (#S). See e.g. [HP91] , part C, chapter 5(b), for a detailed presentation. P
Here is the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Let J be the cut provided by Lemma 4.8 for the complexity of the Σ-truthpredicate. Let I a shorter cut, such that T ∀x∈I 2 x ∈ J. Let a Σ Open Question 4.10 Can one find a numerized, non-sequential, finitely axiomatized theory for which there is a false Σ 0 1 -sentence which is provable on every definable cut?
We draw an obvious corollary. We can extend Lemma 4.8 partly to a wider formula class.
Definition 4.13 Consider any numerized theory T . Let B := ∃x B 0 (x) be a formula of the language of T . Let I be a T -cut. We write B [I] for ∃x∈I B 0 (x) (or: B < ∃x x ∈ I). Theorem 4.14 Let T := T, N be a finitely axiomatized, sequential theory. We write P := P T . For any ∃∀∆ 0 -sentence A, there is a T -cut I such that,
, or equivalently,
The cut I depends only on ρ(A).
Take R as in Theorem 3.4, with P n , for a suitably large n, substituted for P. We find, using cut elimination, from Theorem 3.4:
Let I be an n-reflecting T -cut satisfying I∆ 0 . It is sufficient to show in EA + + BΣ 1 that PA [I] implies PR.
Reason in EA + + BΣ 1 . Suppose PA [I] . Since
it follows, by Fact 2.5(7), that P(
9 Clearly, the first disjunct is T -equivalent to R [I] , and, thus, implies in T that R. Moreover, the second disjunct implies in T that P I n R. Hence, since I is n-reflecting, the second disjunct implies R in T . Thus, we find (outside of T ): PR. P
We can extend Theorem 4.1 to a larger class of theories.
Theorem 4.15 Let T be a consistent, sequential, finitely axiomatized theory. Suppose that T and U are mutually interpretable. Then there is a Σ 0 1 -sound numerization U = U, P of U .
Note that U need not be sequential! Before proving the theorem we need a lemma, which is a strengthening of Löb's Theorem.
Lemma 4.16 Let T = T, N be a numerized, consistent, sequential, finitely axiomatized theory. . Let I be a T -cut and let A be a sentence of the language of T . Then there is a k such that
The number k depends only on the complexities of the axioms of T , the complexity of N , the complexity of I and the complexity of A. Our complexity measure here is ρ, i.e. depth of quantifier changes.
The lemma is a special case of Theorem 4.2 of [Vis93] . We turn to the proof of Theorem 4.15.
Suppose K : T £U and M : U £T . Note that N := N MK is an interpretation of F in T . (We write composition in the order of application here.) By Fact 2.2(3), there is a T -cut J that is T -provably isomorphic with a T -cut J of N . By Fact 2.2(2), we may assume that J satisfies I∆ 0 +Ω 1 . Let K be the ρ-complexity of the Σ 0 1 -truth predicate. By the external form of Lemma 4.16, we can find a k such that, for any A ∈ Γ K+n , if T P
Here n is a sufficiently large number.
By Lemma 4.7, we can find a T -cut I * such that T P I * T ,k B → B, for any B ∈ Γ k . Let I be a subcut of I * such that T ∀x∈I 2 x ∈ I * . By Fact 2.2(2), we may choose I * and I such that they satisfy I∆ 0 + Ω 1 . Consider any Σ 9 Note that, to apply the verbatim statement of Fact 2.5(7) we have to shift to the theory T, I first and, then, shift back to T . Alternatively, we can just run through the proof again for the modified statement.
Let R be such that F R ↔ S 0 ≤ P T ,k R. We have:
Applying Löb's Rule, we have T R. By cutelimination, we find T k R. Hence, by the external version of the proof of the FGH Theorem, we find that S 0 is true and, thus, that S is true. P
On the Manufacture of Faith
We repeat the definition of trustworthiness here.
Definition 5.1 A theory V is trustworthy if every U interpretable in V is also faithfully interpretable in V .
In this section, we will provide a characterization of trustworthy theories. Friedman's result that consistent, finitely axiomatized, sequential theories are trustworthy, will follow from this characterization in combination with Theorem 4.1. Our treatment in this section can be viewed as generalizing some of Per Lindström's work on faithful interpretability. See [Lin97] , chapter 6, §2. The methods used are for a great part those developed by Per Lindström and Viteslav Svejdar.
An Upper Bound
In this subsection we prove an upper bound result. We need two lemmas.
Lemma 5.2 Let T = T, N be a numerized theory. Let Γ be any class of Tsentences for which T contains a definable truth predicate, say TRUE. We only need that TRUE satisfies Tarski's convention. Suppose that the set of codes of elements of Γ has a fixed binumeration in T . Then, there is a unary predicate of numbers A(x), such that T (A(x) ∧ A(y)) → x = y, and such that, for any n, T + A(n) is Γ-conservative over T . We may consider A as representing a closed partial numerical term τ , writing 'τ x' for 'A(x).
We give the proof in appendix B.
Lemma 5.3 Let T = T, N be a numerized theory. Let L be a language of finite signature σ for predicate logic. We call predicate logic of signature σ: FOL σ . Let α(x) be any formula in the language of T such that T proves that all elements of {x | α(x)} are codes of L-sentences. We write P α for provability from the sentences coded by the elements of {x | α(x)}. We write con(α) for ¬ P α ⊥.
There is an interpretation H : (T + con(α)) £ FOL σ such that, for any Lsentence A, we have T + con(α) + P α A A H . We say that H is a Henkin interpretation of α.
Proof
We can see this by inspection of the usual proof of the Interpretation Existence Lemma. The basic idea is that we formalize the Henkin construction, employing definable cuts whenever we would have used induction in PA. See e.g. [Vis91] or [Vis92] . P
We proceed with our, somewhat technical, upperbound result. The bit with the sentence A is present, because we want our result to be applicable also to some theories that are not numerizable. ' shifts with the numerization.) Note that Z P U B ⇒ W P U B. It follows that it is sufficient to prove our theorem for Z. Thus, we may, without loss of generality, assume that W contains a truth predicate, say true, for the Σ 0 1 -sentences. Moreover, we may, by Fact 2.2(2), assume that W proves I∆ 0 + Ω 1 .
Let τ be the partial closed term promised by Lemma 5.2 for W and Σ 0 1 . We fix some standard enumeration C x of the U -sentences in such a way that W verifies its elementary properties. We specify M, in T , by cases. In case we have ¬A, we take M equal to K. Suppose we have A. We may now work in W. Let
1 -axiomatized, and that (ii) in talking about U * we are really talking about the formula defining the axiom set and that (iii) the definition of U * only makes sense in the presence of A. In case incon(U * ), we take M again equal to K. If con(U * ), we take M equal to the Henkin-interpretation H of U * . We give the clauses for M, for the cases of the domain of the interpretation and the translation of a binary predicate:
(In writing e.g. 'incon N (U * )', we intend no relativization of the formula defining the axiom set.)
Clearly, M : T £ U . Suppose T B M . Let ¬ B = C n . We have:
By the Σ 0 1 -conservativity of τ n, we find W P U B. P
The Characterization
In this subsection, we provide the promised characterization of trustworthiness and prove Friedman's result as a corollary. 4. There is a faithful interpretation of predicate logic with one binary relation symbol into T .
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Proof "(1) ⇒ (2)". Suppose T is trustworthy. Say the (relational) signature of number theory is σ. Trivially, the predicate logic FOL σ is interpretable in T . Hence, there is a faithful interpretation, say K, of FOL σ in T . It is easily seen that "(4) ⇒ (2)". Suppose P is a faithful interpretation of predicate logic with one binary relation symbol into T . There is a finitely axiomatized set theory, say S, in the language with just one binary relation symbol into which F is faithfully interpretable, say via Q. See e.g. [MM94] . Hence, T + ( S) P , QP is a Σ 0 1 -sound numerization of an extension of T . "(3) ⇔ (2)". This is immediate, by the fact that F can be interpreted in Q on a cut I. Cuts are downwards closed under ≤. So we can always convert a Σ The definition of trustworthiness is 'neutral' w.r.t. arithmetical theories and the like, in that it does not mention the presence of any device allowing coding. It does not even mention specific signatures. Thus it is remarkable that a theory involving coding is connected via (2) of the theorem to trustworthiness. In appendix C, we will discuss a nice alternative formulation of (2) Example 5.8 PA+incon(PA) is not trustworthy. This can be seen e.g. by noting that PA + incon(PA) £ PA. Since any interpretation of PA in PA + incon(PA) is verifiably an end-extension of the identity interpretation, it will, by the upwards persistence of Σ 0 1 -sentences, satisfy incon(PA). Hence no faithful interpretation of PA in PA + incon(PA) is possible.
In contrast, ACA 0 + incon(ACA 0 ) is trustworthy.
We may use Theorem 4.15 to get a modest strengthening of Friedman's Theorem.
Corollary 5.9 Suppose T is consistent, finitely axiomatized and sequential. Suppose T and U are mutually interpretable. Then U is trustworthy.
Open Question 5.10
We could say that a theory T is solid if every U that is mutually interpretable with T is trustworthy. Is there a perspicuous characterization of solid theories? Note that PA and PA + incon(PA) are mutually interpretable. So, by Example 5.8, PA is trustworthy but not solid.
We proceed with some further corollaries of Theorem 5.5. The following corollary of is easy.
Corollary 5.11 Any subtheory of a trustworthy theory is trustworthy.
Corollary 5.12 Consider Group Theory group c , where we allow an extra constant c in the language. The theory group c is trustworthy.
Proof
Tarski constructs, in [TMR53] , a model G of group c that has as definable inner model the natural numbers with plus and times. In other words, he constructs an interpretation K with K : Th(G)£Th(N). It follows that group c +( 
This is immediate by Theorem 3.6. P Open Question 5.14 What is the complexity of trustworthiness? Our characterization shows that this complexity is at most Σ 
On the Nature of Trustworthiness
The notion of trustworthiness may, at first sight, seem to be somewhat artificial. Thus, one may wonder what structure is 'the natural home' of the notion. I am not sure this question has a unique answer. However, the answer given below is a good candidate. The answer will be that the relevant 'structure' is the embedding functor of two preorders.
Consider the preorder PFI of consistent theories ordered by the relation ¡ f , where U ¡ f V if U is faithfully interpretable in V . We write U ≡ f V for: U ¡ f V and V ¡ f U . Consider also the preorder PI of consistent theories ordered by the relation ¡, where U ¡ V if U is interpretable in V . We write U ≡ V for: U ¡ V and V ¡ U .
These preorders can be viewed as categories in the usual way. If we divide out isomorphisms, we get the partial orderings of degrees of faithful interpretability and of degrees of interpretability.
Let emb be the identical embedding functor from PFI to PI. We will show that emb has a right adjoint, (·), i.e. a mapping from theories to theories satisfying the magical equation 11 :
11 See [Mac71] , for the basic facts on adjunctions.
From this equation, the following facts are immediate consequences.
(·) is a functor.
2. V is trustworthy.
3. V ≡ V . So every degree of interpretability has a trustworthy element.
V is trustworthy iff
We specify (·). Consider a theory T . We expand the signature of T with a unary predicate P and with a binary predicate R. The theory T is the theory axiomatized by the axioms of T where we relativize the quantifiers to P . No non-logical principles concerning R are added. (The logical axioms concerning identity belong to predicate logic and are left unrelativized.) It is easily seen that (a) T ≡ T . By a simple model-theoretical argument, we may show that T is conservative over predicate logic with just the binary relation symbol R.
Hence, by translating R as R(x, y), the theory T faithfully interprets predicate logic with just the binary relation symbol R. By Theorem 5.5(4), it follows that (b) T is trustworthy. From (a) and (b), it is immediate that (·) is right adjoint to emb.
In case T has an infinite model, we can skip the relativization to P in the construction of T . Thus we only need to expand the signature with R. Note that sequential theories are not closed under relativization of the domain. However, sequential theories are closed under adding predicate symbols. By the preceding observation, the mapping add a binary relation symbol will be right adjoint of the embedding functor, if we restrict both preorders to consistent sequential theories.
In case a numerization T, N satisfies full induction, we can also take for T , the theory PA + {con n (T ) | n ∈ ω}, where con n (T ) means consistency of the set of axioms of T with Gödel number less than or equal to n. It follows that we can find an appropriate right adjoint, if we restrict both preorders to consistent extensions of PA in the arithmetical language.
By Theorem 5.9, consistent, finitely axiomatized, sequential theories T have the further property that if T ≡ U , then T ≡ f U . It is easy to see that this property is equivalent to the property of solidity introduced in Question 5.10.
[VV94] L.C. 
A A Notational Convention
In this appendix we make the convention for the use of two kinds of variables and of boxes precise. Let T = T, N , T = T , N , . . . , be numerized theories and let U, U , . . . , be arbitrary theories. We assume that each theory comes equipped with a ∆ b 1 -formula defining the axiom set. We treat the case, where we just have ordinary boxes in the language. Addition of e.g. P T ,n and P U,n is entirely analogous.
We assume the language L T of T has variables ξ, ξ , . . .. We enrich L T to a language L T with a second kind of variables x, x , . . . and with unary operators P U and P T , for various U and T . The terms of the extended language are the smallest set containing both sets of variables and closed under the term-forming operations of L T . The set of formulas of L T is the smallest set F such that:
• P (t 0 , · · · , t n−1 ) is in F , if the t i are terms of the extended language and P is an n-ary predicate symbol of L T ;
• F is closed under the propositional connectives and under the quantifiers ∀x, ∃x, ∀ξ, ∃ξ, for all variables x and ξ;
• If A is a sentence of L U , then P U A is in F ;
• If A is a formula of L T with only free variables in x, x , y, . . ., then P T A is in F .
B Conservativity
In this appendix, we prove Lemma 5.2. Let T = T, N be a numerized theory. Let Γ be any class of T -sentences for which T contains a definable truth predicate, say TRUE. We only need that TRUE satisfies Tarski's convention. We assume that the set of codes of elements of Γ has a fixed binumeration in T . We show that there is a unary predicate of numbers A(x), such that T (A(x) ∧ A(y)) → x = y, such that, for any n, T + A(n) is Γ-conservative over T .
We define, in T , using the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, the formula A(x) as follows.
We assume that the formalization of proof is standard, so that every proof has a single conclusion C with C < p, etc. We first prove the uniqueness clause. Reason in T . Suppose that x = y and A(x) and A(y). Let p be a witness for A(x) and let q be a witness of A(y). By our assumption about the proof predicate, it follows that p = q. since in F, we have the linearity of <, it follows that p < q or q < p. By the specification of A, it follows that this is impossible.
We move to the metatheory again. We prove our theorem by induction on Tproofs. Suppose, that for all T -proofs q < p, we have, if q : T A(m) → D, for some m and for some D ∈ Γ, then T D. ('r : T E' means: r is a T -proof of E.) Suppose further that p : T A(n) → C, for C ∈ Γ. We show T C. From our assumptions, we have the following propositions.
It follows that:
Using (3), (4) and the specification of A, we may conclude that:
Consider any q < p, D < p with D ∈ Γ, and m < p. In case we have: q : T A(m) → D, it follows, by the minimality of p, that T D. In this case the disjunct corresponding to q in (6) is T -provably equivalent to absurdity and may be omitted. Suppose that q does not witness
. So again we may omit the disjunct corresponding to q. Thus the whole disjunction of (6) reduces to ⊥. We may conclude: T C. Quod erat demonstrandum.
Consider any interpretation M for τ . We construct a new interpretation P as follows:
Ad (4) . Let σ be the signature of arithmetic. We have F ∧ con(T ) ∼ σ T ⊥, for any T . This is, in fact, Pudlák's strong version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. On the other hand, if we take T e.g. PA, clearly F ∧ con(T ) σ T ⊥. P A T -model N of signature τ , is a model for signature τ that is isomorphic to an internal model of a model M of T . Internal models are given by interpretations K. We could call the internal model of M given by K: K M . Thus, N is a T -model iff, for some model M |= T and for some interpretation for signature τ , N is isomorphic to K M . We can understand in terms of T -models, as follows.
Here is an example illustrating the non-compactness of ∼.
Example C.3 Let σ be the signature of arithmetic. Let T be a finitely axiomatized, consistent, sequential theory. Let U := F + {con n (T ) | n ∈ ω}. (Here, we can use either the complexity measure 'depth of connectives' or the measure 'depth of quantifier changes'.) Then, since U is locally, but not globally interpretable in T , we find that ∼ is not compact.
To provide an example to illustrate the non-compactness of , we need a result of Jan Krajíček.
Theorem C.4 Let T = T, N be I∆ 0 or let T be finitely axiomatized, consistent and sequential. There is a mapping I → k I , from T -cuts to natural numbers, such that the theory
is locally interpretable in T , and, hence, consistent.
12 Here the complexity measure used is depth of connectives. We can, however, also use depth of quantifier changes.
For a proof, see [Kra87] , section 3. The functionality suggested by our notation 'kraj(T )' is par abus de langage, since the theory does not seem to be uniquely determined by the data. In fact, I have the following conjecture.
12 By inspecting the argument, it becomes clear that Krajíček's theory is recursively enumerable. I did not check that the axioms are indeed p-time decidable. However, we can always apply Craig's trick to obtain a p-time decidable axiomatization. Note that the verification of Craig's trick demands a metatheory containing Σ 0 1 -collection.
Open Question C.5 Prove or refute the following conjecture. There are infinitely many theories satisfying the description of kraj(T ) that are pairwise not mutually interpretable.
By construction, the theory kraj(T ) is not trustworthy. It follows from Theorem 5.9 that kraj(T ) is not globally interpretable in T . We can now present the promised example for the non-compactness of .
Example C.6 Let T = T, N be I∆ 0 or let T be finitely axiomatized, consistent and sequential. Let U := F + {con n (T ) | n ∈ ω}. Now it is easy to see that U kraj(T ) ⊥, but that, for no finite subtheory U 0 of U , we have U 0 kraj(T ) ⊥. Hence, is not compact.
Our notions have at most complexity Π Consider the sentence A := ∀x ∃y A 0 (x, y), where A 0 ∈ ∆ 0 . Let S x := ∃y A 0 (x, y). Let R x the FGH-sentence for W and S x . We define:
Suppose that A. Let K be any interpretation for the signature σ. Consider the interpretation M such that, in T , M is K if ( F) K and N , otherwise. Clearly, M : T £ F. By Fact 2.2(3), there is a T -cut I of N , such that I ≤ T M. By the construction of W , we have P W incon I n (T ), for some n. It follows that
Thus, we get (b):
We may conclude, combining (a) and (b), that
For the converse, suppose that Λ σ W F → Q. Consider any n. Pick a T -cut I such that P W con I n (T ). By our assumption, we have P W Q I . Hence, P W R I n and, so, P W R n . By the FGH-Theorem, we may conclude that S n . P
We show how various notions of this paper can be formulated in a natural way in terms of derivable and admissible consequence. Let σ be the signature of arithmetic. We need the following definitions.
• Let T n be {0 = 0} if n = 0 and the set of true Π 0 n -sentences otherwise.
• Suppose F ⊆ Γ. We define: Γ n T A :⇔ Γ, T n T A.
• Suppose F ⊆ Γ. We define:
• T, n-con adm (U ) iff not U ∼ n T ⊥.
• T, n-con(U ) iff not U n T ⊥.
We now have:
2. T, n-con(U ) iff there is a Σ 0 n -sound T -model of U .
3. A theory T is consistent and numerizable iff T, 0-con adm (F).
4. If T, 0-con(Q), then T is undecidable.
(This follows from Tarski's Theorem that if an essentially undecidable theory is interpretable in a consistent extension of a given theory T , then T is undecidable. In fact T, 0-con(U ) iff U is weakly interpretable in T .) We may conclude that T, 1-con(Q) implies T, n-con(Q), for all n.
Note that Q in the above statements can be replaced by F or S 1 2 or I∆ 0 , by the fact that these stronger theories are interpretable on a cut in Q.
Remark C.9 Consider a ∆ b 1 -axiomatizable theory T satisfying T, 0-con(Q). By Theorem 3.6, T is in Turing degree 0 . William Hanf showed that there are finitely axiomatized T in any recursively enumerable Turing degree. (Even that there are essentially undecidable, finitely axiomatized theories of any recursively enumerable degree of unsolvability.) See [Han65] . Ergo, there are finitely axiomatized, undecidable theories T such that T, 0-incon(Q).
D On the Existential Axioms of Q
In this appendix, we discuss a detail of the proof of Wilkie's Theorem that I∆ 0 is interpretable on an initial segment in Q. An initial segment, is a definable set of numbers Q-provably closed under S and downwards closed under ≤. To prove Wilkie's Theorem, it is convenient to take ≤ a primitive symbol. If we would take it as defined by ∃z z + x = y, then we would have to state explicitely that on an initial segment I, the meaning of ≤ is preserved, i.e. that ≤ I is equal to ≤ I. This sameness of meaning is important, since we want downwards preservation of Π 0 1 -sentences to the initial segment and upwards preservation of Σ 0 1 -sentences from the segment. These preservation results are e.g. used to get initial segments with more and more ∆ 0 -induction.
Hájek and Pudlák wisely choose to treat ≤ as a primitive symbol. However, on p369, in their proof of Wilkie's Theorem, they stumble in the last step. They write: ". . . we can trivially interpret Q by eliminating ≤ from the language and deleting Q8." In other words, they redefine ≤. This argument won't wash, since they need the new ≤ on the initial segment to be the restriction of the old ≤ to the inital segment. Otherwise, the central argument does not go through.
Fortunately the gap in the argument of Hájek and Pudlák is easily closed by proceeding analogously to their verification of Q3 on the initial segment I: prove, by induction on x, that ∀y≤ x ∃z≤x z + y = x. (We need some auxiliary inductions to show e.g. that x ≤ x and x ≤ Sx.)
However, the problem to verify the existential axioms Q3 and Q8 also occurs in the case of the interpretation of Hájek and Pudlák's theory Q + in Q. For this reason, I prefer another strategy to settle the problem of these axioms for once and for all, right from the start.
We work in Q. We use the easily verifiable theorem that x + y = 0 → x = y = 0. A number x is L-successive iff ∀y ∀z (y + z = x → Sy + z = Sx). We show that 0 is L-successive. Suppose that y + z = 0. Then y = z = 0. Moreover, Sy + z = S0 + 0 = S0. Next we show that the L-successive numbers are closed under successor. Suppose x is L-successive and suppose y + z = Sx. We want to show that Sy + z = SSx. In case z = 0, we have y = Sx and, hence, Sy+0 = Sy = SSx. In case y = Su, we have y+Su = Sx. So, S(y+u) = Sx. Ergo y +u = x. Since x is L-successive, we have Sy +u = Sx and, so, S(Sy +u) = SSx. We may conclude that Sy + Su = SSx.
A number x is a commutator iff ∀y ∀z (y + z = x → z + y = x). We say that x is a strong commutator iff x is L-successive and x is a commutator. We already know that 0 is L-successive. Moreover, if y + z = 0, then y = z = 0, and, hence, z + y = 0. So 0 is a strong commutator. We show that the strong commutators are closed under successor. Suppose x is a strong commutator. By the above argument, Sx is L-successive. Suppose y + z = Sx. To show: z + y = Sx. First suppose z = 0. We have y = y + 0 = Sx. So we need to show that 0 + Sx = Sx.
We have x + 0 = x. So, since x is a commutator, we find 0 + x = x and, hence 0 + Sx = Sx.. Next, suppose z = Su. We have y + Su = Sx. Then, y + u = x. Hence, since x is a commutator, we have u+y = x. Ergo, since x is L-successive, Su + y = Sx.
Theorem D.1 (in Q) Suppose, that the elements of an initial segment I are all commutators. Then, the segment I verifies Q3 and Q8.
Proof
Reason in Q. Suppose Sx is in I. We have x + S0 = Sx. Since, Sx is a commutator, we find S0 + x = Sx. Ergo x ≤ Sx. Hence x ∈ I. Thus any non-zero number in I has a predecessor in I. Suppose x ≤ y, for y ∈ I. Then, for some z, z +x = y. Since, y is a commutator, we find x + z = y, and so z ≤ y. Hence z ∈ I. P Now we execute the remaining part of the proof of Wilkie's Theorem inside the strong commutators, without worries about Q3 and Q8. We need closure of the strong commutors under successor to construct the appropriate initial segments.
